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**HOW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD SOUGHT TO ASSERT CIVILIAN  
CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY**

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## HOW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD SOUGHT TO ASSERT CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

*“The Secretary of Defense is not supposed to be a super General or Admiral. His task is to exercise civilian control over the Department for the Commander-in-Chief and the country.”*  
Donald H. Rumsfeld<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

Donald H. Rumsfeld was sworn in on January 20 as Secretary of Defense for an administration whose campaign pledge was “Help is on the way.” It soon became clear that this “help” included a new way of doing things at the Pentagon, as Rumsfeld began a difficult and controversial strategic review designed to transform the military. This paper explores how Rumsfeld sought to assert civilian control over the military, beginning with the review. Various methods of control were employed, some of which caused difficulties with the military and Congress, two key actors in national defense matters. In the long run, Rumsfeld’s style of civilian control – or at least the one most likely to be successful with the military and Congress – will be a corporate model that instills sound business practices at the Pentagon. This is shaped by Rumsfeld’s extensive experience in the government and, in particular, the private sector.<sup>2</sup>

### Why Civilian Control?

Although its limits are subject to debate,<sup>3</sup> civilian control over the military is a fundamental and ingrained concept in the U.S.<sup>4</sup> It is based on the U.S. Constitution, which provides for a sharing of civilian control by the President (as Commander in Chief) and the Congress (through its power to appropriate money to the military, make rules governing the military and declare war). Rumsfeld, however, did not seek to assert civilian control purely for constitutional

considerations. Rather, it appears that there were at least two more specific reasons for asserting civilian control. First, some in the new Bush administration believed that civilian control had eroded under President Bill Clinton.<sup>5</sup> They felt that the problems with the military were a result of “eight years of no discipline during the Clinton-run Pentagon.”<sup>6</sup> Second, Rumsfeld was seeking fundamental changes in the way the military operated – transformation is the buzzword – and felt that could not be accomplished by relying solely on the military.<sup>7</sup> A think tank report warning that the Pentagon had been working on position papers for some time and could stall any efforts at significant change fueled this concern.<sup>8</sup> These two issues – lax control under Clinton and transformation – combined with a business orientation, served as the impetus for Rumsfeld’s actions.

### **Civilian Control During the Review Process**

Rumsfeld’s conduct of an initial strategic review of the military, and the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), provide examples of how he sought to assert civilian control. These two reviews are closely related in time and purpose, but are discussed separately to highlight different methods of civilian control.<sup>9</sup>

Initial Strategic Review. That Rumsfeld immediately undertook a strategic review of the military should not have come as a surprise to anyone. In a September 1999 speech at the Citadel, then candidate George W. Bush declared that he would conduct a comprehensive review of the military.<sup>10</sup> Rumsfeld echoed this in his confirmation testimony before the Senate.<sup>11</sup> The controversy and insights on civilian control do not revolve around the decision to have a review, but rather the manner in which it was conducted.

From the beginning, Rumsfeld made it clear that he was in charge and wanted to keep tight control on the Pentagon and the review process. During his first collective meeting with the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), two days after being sworn in, Rumsfeld “ordered the services to stop briefing members of Congress on perceived money shortages.”<sup>12</sup> Soon after, a broader prohibition came down from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD): no military officer was to talk to Congress without Rumsfeld’s permission, an order that was quickly modified to only require that Rumsfeld be informed prior to such contacts.<sup>13</sup> (The modification may have acknowledged the military’s responsibility to communicate directly with Congress, or perhaps the difficulty in controlling the information flowing to Congress.)

Reflecting the “no talk” orders were the two major characteristics of the review process: limited military involvement and secrecy. The review was accomplished through a variety of panels set up to look at particular issues, such as conventional forces, transformation and acquisition. It was difficult to determine the exact number of panels – with estimates ranging from 12 to 21 – some of which were only one person writing a very specific report.<sup>14</sup> The military’s limited role in the review was presaged by OSD’s decision to ignore significant work the JCS had done in preparation for the QDR.<sup>15</sup> This was followed by the exclusion of active duty military personnel from formal participation on the review panels. This exclusion also largely applied to civilian employees of the Pentagon.<sup>16</sup> All of the panels were chaired by civilians – most from outside the Pentagon – including retired military.<sup>17</sup> Active duty military “participation” was limited to responding to specific factual or technical questions from some of the panels.

The number of participants on these panels was kept to a minimum and buffered by a wall of silence, as those involved were “sworn to secrecy.”<sup>18</sup> Even the names of panel members were supposed to be kept secret. In most cases, active duty military – including those who provided information – never saw the final reports from these panels. The focus on secrecy was based on

Rumsfeld's concern over leaks,<sup>19</sup> and his desire that any findings not be debated elsewhere before being considered within the Pentagon.

This secrecy and limited military involvement led to much uncertainty and speculation. The military wondered whether the review was merely an “independent assessment” or an attempt to replace the QDR.<sup>20</sup> The media could not always get it straight. For example, it erroneously reported for several months that Andrew Marshall, the head of the Office of Net Assessment who was chairing the important strategy panel, was in charge of the entire review.<sup>21</sup> The truth was, the review was a set of disparate and contradictory reports and recommendations that did not provide for coordination among the panels, nor an overall look at the military.<sup>22</sup> Toward the end of May, the initial strategic review came to an end and Rumsfeld decided to “fold it” into the formal QDR process.<sup>23</sup> In so doing, much of the initial review was ignored by those involved in the QDR.<sup>24</sup>

QDR. The QDR is a congressionally mandated,<sup>25</sup> comprehensive review of national defense strategy and military force structure. The first QDR, conducted in 1997, was a disappointment to many and seen as a document that justified business as usual.<sup>26</sup> Rumsfeld wanted this QDR, in light of the call for transformation, to be different. This was reflected in the manner in which it was accomplished, if not in the final product. Time was an issue, since by law the QDR had to be given to Congress no later than September 30.

The QDR process began after an apparently stormy meeting on May 22 between Rumsfeld and the JCS, in which Rumsfeld expressed his frustration over leaks during the initial review and the JCS responded with criticisms over being excluded from the review process. Rumsfeld agreed to meet “every working day” for the next week with the JCS, to be followed by “intensive discussions over the next six weeks to hammer out a new defense strategy.”<sup>27</sup> These meetings

laid the foundation for a QDR process that, at least on the surface, was much different than the initial review process. Under the QDR, the military had greater involvement and Pentagon civilians, rather than outsiders, exercised control.

A Senior Level Review Group (SLRG) that included Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, the service secretaries and the JCS, oversaw the QDR. Acting as a board of directors, the SLRG provided the initial guidance that was developed into the Terms of Reference (TOR) issued on June 22. The TOR framed the issues and provided direction on how the QDR should proceed.<sup>28</sup> The TOR also established the Executive Working Group (EWG), whose meetings were chaired by Rumsfeld's special assistant, Stephen Cambone.<sup>29</sup> The military and OSD staff were members of and formally participated on the EWG. Among other things, the EWG supported the SLRG and oversaw and harmonized the work of Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) that were established to prepare specific parts of the QDR. Of the eight IPTs, only one (Military Organizations and Arrangements) was chaired by the military. Still, there was significant formal military involvement on all of the IPTs.

While military involvement in the QDR was much greater than during the initial review, there are different perspectives on the military's impact on the QDR. On the one hand, there is substantial evidence that, through various meetings, there was significant military input and participation in the process and the senior military leadership was given an opportunity to provide comments that were incorporated in the final document.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, some felt the military was marginalized in a top down process controlled by civilians who wrote the documents, and that many of the meetings with Rumsfeld were one-sided, with Rumsfeld doing all of the talking.<sup>31</sup> This belief may be a reflection of the mistrust sown during the initial strategic review.<sup>32</sup>

Time was a constraint. The September 30 deadline did not allow for significant analysis<sup>33</sup> and may not have given the JCS sufficient time to prepare for meetings and provide informed opinions.<sup>34</sup> Some of those involved blame Rumsfeld for “wasting” months on the initial review process and speculate that this was planned to limit the time for and military involvement in the QDR. Time pressures contributed to what most agree was a watered-down and non-transformational QDR<sup>35</sup> that deferred many critical decisions.<sup>36</sup> Complaints over the QDR were muted, however, because it was eclipsed by the events of September 11 and did not immediately jeopardize any significant programs.

### **Responses by the Military and Congress**

The reactions of the military and Congress to Rumsfeld’s efforts to exert control, particularly during the initial review, were a result of feeling left out of the process. One general summed it up for many in the military by quipping that “We’ve been left out of the loop.”<sup>37</sup> Members of Congress “complained that they, like the military, had felt excluded from the process.”<sup>38</sup>

Upset at being excluded or ignored, the military grew “increasingly worried,”<sup>39</sup> first over the process and then the substantive decisions that were seemingly being made in their absence. While the complaints initially may have stayed inside the Pentagon, information began to be leaked to the press and Congress. The complaints and leaks seemed to build during late March and April, spurred on by Rumsfeld’s testimony in Congress and the late April/early May due date of reports under the initial strategic review.<sup>40</sup> The complaints and leaks dissipated after the JCS/Rumsfeld May 22 meeting and with greater military involvement in the QDR process. This was, however, only a temporary lull. The complaints and leaks started up again in July and August, focused on significant substantive decisions.

The military found a friendly ear in Congress, whose feelings of being ignored began with the failure to select members of Congress and staff for Department of Defense (DoD) positions.<sup>41</sup> This included passing over former senator Dan Coats (R-Indiana) for Secretary of Defense and former representative Tillie Fowler (R-Florida) for Secretary of the Army.<sup>42</sup> While these concerns were mollified by the appointment of several congressional staff to DoD positions,<sup>43</sup> they were supplanted by worries over Rumsfeld's initial strategic review. Congressional concerns at first related mostly to the process and the secretive nature of the review.<sup>44</sup> For instance, some in Congress suggested that federal law required open meetings during Rumsfeld's initial review.<sup>45</sup> In a more serious gesture, republican senators in early May held up the confirmation of several DoD nominees "to protest what the senators consider Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's lack of communication with Congressional leaders."<sup>46</sup>

The biggest conflicts with Congress, however, were reserved for substantive decisions during the QDR process, particularly those related to military base closings and force structure. By late July, Rumsfeld apparently had a plan to close dozens of military bases, a controversial subject, particularly for representatives who have bases in their districts. The classified plan quickly found its way to Congress, whose members just as quickly made it clear that the closures would not be supported.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, military concerns and complaints began to build as an early August internal Pentagon force structure meeting approached. Rumors that Rumsfeld would propose cutting the size of the Army found their way to Congress. A letter signed by 82 members of Congress (45 Republicans and 37 Democrats) informed Rumsfeld "as you proceed with your review, we hope you will consider our strong opposition to any proposal that would seek to diminish the current levels of Army force structure."<sup>48</sup> As a result, Rumsfeld postponed any decisions regarding force structure cuts.<sup>49</sup> By that time, however, Rumsfeld's approach had

fostered an alliance between disaffected military and Congress.<sup>50</sup> That alliance and preemptive strikes by Congress – based on leaks and rumors – did not bode well for relations between Congress and DoD, and undermined Rumsfeld’s review and authority.

### **The Service Secretaries and the Senior Executive Council**

Reflecting his business experience and orientation, Rumsfeld has tried to assert a particular type of civilian control through his choice of service secretaries and the way they manage DoD. Although there was speculation that Rumsfeld purposefully delayed some appointments to avoid “turf protection” by new appointees<sup>51</sup> – the service secretaries were not sworn into office until late May/early June – it appears that he got exactly what he wanted with his three service secretaries.<sup>52</sup> All three had significant corporate experience, and were known for having revitalized their companies.<sup>53</sup>

James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, was the Corporate Vice President for Northrop Grumman. In that position, he was the “architect of Northrop Grumman’s conversion from an airframe maker into an electronics powerhouse.”<sup>54</sup> (Roche is also a retired Navy Captain.) Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy, was the executive vice-president of General Dynamics who “cut F-16 costs as orders declined.”<sup>55</sup> Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army, was Vice Chairman of Enron Energy Services. He was commended for slashing the workforce by 40%, while converting Enron from a “stodgy pipeline company into a dynamic energy concern.”<sup>56</sup> (White is also a retired Brigadier General.) Navy Secretary England declared that the service secretaries “are here to fundamentally improve the business practices of the Department of Defense and our respective services, and we will work together to do that.”<sup>57</sup>

The business approach was to be developed through a Senior Executive Council (SEC), established in June. Proposed to act as a board of directors,<sup>58</sup> SEC members include Rumsfeld,

Wolfowitz, the service secretaries and Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The role of the SEC is to “implement modern business practices in the department and to guide transformation efforts in the services.”<sup>59</sup> Making the Pentagon more business-like was brought closer to the working level by the establishment, also in June, of the Business Initiatives Council (BIC). Chaired by Aldridge, the BIC will “recommend good business practices and find and implement cost savings.”<sup>60</sup>

While its actual function and impact seem unclear – due in part to the events of September 11 – there appears to be renewed interest in a modified SEC. Recent DoD documents note that under the SEC “political appointees would be given a larger role in the Pentagon’s crucial programming, planning and budget process.”<sup>61</sup> The SEC will meet twice a year to help develop the Defense Planning Guidance. While the CJCS may be included on the SEC, the revised role of this group would appear to strengthen civilian – service secretary – control over the military.<sup>62</sup>

### **Budget Decisions**

Many interpreted the “help is on the way” slogan to mean that there would be an (immediate) infusion of money to the military.<sup>63</sup> There was much disappointment when the funding increases – both for the fiscal year 2001 supplemental and the 2002 budget – were not as big or quick as expected. This was because Rumsfeld had decided early in the process that any significant budget increases would only come after the review was conducted.<sup>64</sup> In part this may reflect the priority given to tax cuts. Nevertheless, presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer, speaking of the decision to defer the supplemental request, made it clear that it was “‘a signal of fiscal discipline’ and an assertion of civilian control over the military.”<sup>65</sup> By not just “throwing money” at the military, this “strategy first” decision complemented the business practices approach of the service secretaries.

### **Post-September 11 Assertion of Civilian Control**

Criticism continued to build, and by late August many were predicting the end of Rumsfeld and his efforts to transform the military.<sup>66</sup> Rumsfeld's stature, however, has risen significantly because of his performance since the September 11 terrorist attacks. While less overt, there have been some discrete steps – besides the potential resurgence of the SEC noted above – that would appear to further civilian control. These include: the establishment of the Office of Force Transformation, as called for in the QDR (with retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski as its director and reporting to the Secretary of Defense);<sup>67</sup> the naming of Army Secretary White as the DoD's Executive Agent for homeland security matters;<sup>68</sup> and Rumsfeld's request to Congress for the creation of two senior-level civilian positions: undersecretaries for homeland security and intelligence.<sup>69</sup>

The most significant steps taken toward asserting civilian control, however, relate to the highly lauded performance of the seemingly omnipresent Rumsfeld since September 11. Taking center stage in the strategy and prosecution of the war in Afghanistan, he has become the face and voice of the U.S. military, in large part through the more than 100 press conferences and interviews he has given since September 11.<sup>70</sup> Not only has Rumsfeld conducted a large number of press conferences personally, he is often seen at the side of General Tommy R. Franks, Commander in Chief, Central Command, during the latter's press conferences.<sup>71</sup> All this has the effect of demonstrating that the Secretary of Defense – a civilian – is in charge of the war and the military. As one senior senator noted recently, this increased stature and prestige should provide “tremendous clout” and bode well for changes Rumsfeld wants to make at the Pentagon.<sup>72</sup>

## Conclusion

Over the past year, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has sought to assert civilian control for different reasons and in different ways. The initial strategic review, QDR and war against terrorism are examples of how he tried to assert civilian control in specific, time-sensitive and pressure situations. The initial strategic review may have been less about asserting civilian control, than the actions of a new CEO trying to get an independent look at an organization, and afraid that an entrenched bureaucracy (military or civilian) would resist any change. This is evidenced by the exclusion of Pentagon civilian staff along with the military, while relying almost wholly on outsiders. The QDR reflected a more conventional method of civilian control, where Pentagon civilians were clearly in charge, while the military was significantly involved in the process. Time constraints, exclusionary tactics and lingering suspicions over Rumsfeld's motives for the controversial initial review, however, cast a shadow over the QDR. As a result of his performance in managing the military aspects of the war against terrorism since September 11, Rumsfeld has shown how a more personal type of civilian control can be attained through increased respect and prestige.

Has Rumsfeld been successful in asserting civilian control? If civilian control is tied to his efforts to transform the military, then the answer is probably "no," since neither the initial review nor the QDR significantly moved the military toward transformation. The failure (so far) of transformation, however, does not signal the demise of civilian control at the Pentagon. In light of the events of September 11, perhaps the more pertinent question is whether Rumsfeld's efforts at transformation and civilian control will be successful in the future. The answer here seems more positive, *if* Rumsfeld can channel his newfound popularity and convert it into an approach that is compatible with the interests and cultures of the military and Congress.

Both the military and Congress rebelled against the secretive and exclusionary nature of the two review processes. While there appear to be few (public) complaints over Rumsfeld's performance since September 11, this may reflect a reluctance to complain during a war effort, rather than satisfaction with Rumsfeld's performance. The sometimes direct and heavy-handed approach that serves well during war may not be appropriate at other times.<sup>73</sup> A more transparent and participatory approach may be called for, particularly during peacetime and for more mundane actions.

It is here that the service secretaries, and plans for managing the Pentagon through a board of directors (the SEC), may provide the best future course for civilian control. Rumsfeld should explicitly reassert and apply the business practices model that was espoused when he arrived at the Pentagon. It would provide a sense of integrity and certainty. In other words, the military and Congress can understand businessmen that implement sound business practices. In part, this is because civilian control is not just about putting civilians at the helm, but rather how they exercise control. Such control can be expressed through a corporate model – and applied to a large government bureaucracy like the Pentagon – if the goals, incentives and procedures are made clear to all involved.

The military respects civilian control and Congress understands that this authority must be shared. Rumsfeld should view and treat them both with respect, while recognizing that each has a distinct culture and responsibility. If he fails to do so, the heightened political astuteness<sup>74</sup> of the military, and the wrath of a Congress that feels excluded, could greatly hinder his attempts to assert civilian control and transform the military.

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<sup>1</sup> Found in “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” [www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2001/rumsfeldsrules.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2001/rumsfeldsrules.pdf). (This statement was made during Rumsfeld’s first tour as Secretary of Defense.)

<sup>2</sup> It is useful to have a basic understanding of Rumsfeld’s extensive government and private sector experience. The following information was gathered from a website ([www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef\\_bio.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html)) and newspaper article (Jonathan Weisman, “A Warrior In One Battle, Manager in Another,” *USA Today*, December 21, 2001, 6A.) After graduating from Princeton University, Rumsfeld served in the Navy for 40 months. He was a congressman from Illinois’ 13<sup>th</sup> District from 1963-1969. This was followed by a string of government positions, including Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, counselor to President Nixon and U.S. Ambassador to NATO. After a short stint as President Ford’s Chief of Staff, Rumsfeld became the youngest Secretary of Defense (at age 43) and served in that position for 14 months from 1975-1977. Particularly during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, he became known for his political acumen. (“[Henry] Kissinger once admitted that Rumsfeld was the only person ever to get the best of him in a political fight.” Michael Duffy, “Rumsfeld: Older but Wiser? The Infighter Who Tried to Change the Pentagon has Failed So Far. Here’s Why,” *Time*, August 27, 2001, v 158, issue 8, p. 22 (Duffy). Kissinger, well-respected for his political skills, noted that “Rumsfeld afforded me a close-up look at a special Washington phenomenon: the skilled full-time politician bureaucrat in whom ambition, ability and substance fuse seamlessly.” Robert Mann, “The Top-Drawer in the Cabinet,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2001.) Rumsfeld then focused on the corporate world, serving in a variety of high-level positions over the next 24 years. These included: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co. (1977-85); Senior Adviser to William Blair & Co. (1985-90); CEO and Chairman of General Instrument Corp. (1990-93); and Chairman of Gilead Sciences (1997-2001). During this time, he remained engaged in some government-related activities, serving as special envoy to the Middle East (1983-84) and chairman of two defense-related commissions (in the 1990s).

<sup>3</sup> For an interesting discussion on recent issues of civilian control over the military, see A.J. Bacevich, “Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?,” *JFQ*, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, 76; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civilian Control: A National Crisis?,” *JFQ*, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, 80; Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, “Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Winter 1999, 193; Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (editors), “Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,” (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts) 2001.

<sup>4</sup> “Civilian Control of Military Based on Constitution,” *FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database*, May 5, 2001 (“we hardly give [civilian control over the military] a second thought.”).

<sup>5</sup> David Tucker, “Does Rumsfeld Know What He Is Doing?,” *Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs at Ashland University*, June 2001 ([www.ashbrook.org](http://www.ashbrook.org)). (Tucker)

<sup>6</sup> Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” *Washington Times*, August 10, 2001, 10. (“Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is overseeing this year’s QDR with a theme of restoring civilian control at the Pentagon and challenging long-held assumptions.”) See also “Rumsfeld’s ‘Defense Inc.’ Reasserts Civilian Control,” *Washington Times*, April 24, 2001 (*Washington Times*, April 24) (“Rumsfeld has a mantra: ‘We have to reassert civilian control of the Department of Defense,’ said a congressional defense staffer. ‘He believes that under the administration of the last eight years the civilian leadership was weak and ineffective.’”).

<sup>7</sup> Tucker; Duffy.

<sup>8</sup> Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter and Zalmay Khalilzad, “Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security,” (RAND Corporation, 2000) (Santa Monica CA). See Jamie Dettmer, “Contractors Bemoan Delay in Defense Appointments,” *Insight on the News*, April 23, 2001 (Dettmer) (Rumsfeld is heeding advice of RAND Corp. transition paper warning that uniformed military had prepared documents justifying “more of the same.”).

<sup>9</sup> Much of this discussion is based on the author’s interviews in early January 2002, with two military officers stationed at the Pentagon during the review process and knowledgeable about the matters discussed in this paper. (Military interviews A and B.) Unless otherwise noted, they are the source of the information and will not be cited, except for assertions that may not be commonly known or accepted.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, “For Rumsfeld, Many Roadblocks,” *Washington Post*, August 7, 2001, 1 (Ricks, August 7) (“As president, I will begin an immediate, comprehensive review of our military covering the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement.”).

<sup>11</sup> Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, “*Prepared Statement by Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld for his Confirmation Hearing Before the SASC*,” 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, January 11, 2001, 3. See Linda D. Kozaryn, “Rumsfeld Takes Pentagon Helm,” *Armed Forces Press Service*, January 22, 2001

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<sup>12</sup> George C. Wilson, “Rumsfeld Faces Big Choices in Second Tour at Pentagon,” *Government Executive Magazine*, January 3, 2001 ([www.GovExec.com](http://www.GovExec.com)).

<sup>13</sup> Military interview A. See Paul Richter, “Bush’s Defense Secretary Goes on the Offensive,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 22, 2001, part A, p. 1. (“[Rumsfeld] sought to limit contacts between the military and Congress by requiring notice and approval before any meetings.”)

<sup>14</sup> See Michael Catanzaro, “The Revolution in Military Affairs Has An Enemy: Politics,” *The American Enterprise*, October 2001, v. 12, issue 7, p. 24 (“12 panels of experts”); Robert F. Dorr, “DOD and Senate Feel Winds of Change,” *Aerospace America*, July 2001, 8 (“no fewer than 21 reviews”). There were actually 16 panels. Military interview B.

<sup>15</sup> See Paul Richter, “For Military, Bush Is Not Yet All That He Can Be,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 2001, part A, p.1 (Rumsfeld review to go forward despite months of work by the Pentagon in preparation for the QDR); Elaine Grossman, “New President to Put Mark on Major Review,” *Inside the Pentagon*, November 2, 2000 (The rejection of the JCS’ prior QDR work was foreshadowed prior to the election, when a source stated that the “Bush team would scrap all that.”) The previous Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, had warned the JCS not to present any recommendations in writing to the new Secretary of defense, because it would be intruding on the latter’s prerogatives. Military interview B.

<sup>16</sup> Military interviews A and B.

<sup>17</sup> Some of the “outside” panel chairmen were: David C. Gompert, President of RAND Corp. (conventional forces panel); ret. General James P. McCarthy (transformation); ret. Admiral David E. Jeremiah (morale and quality of life); and Jack Welch, former assistant secretary of the Air Force (business and purchasing). Even Andrew Marshall, the head of the Office of Net Assessment who chaired the strategy panel, while technically an insider, had difficult relations with others in the Pentagon. See e.g., Ricks August 7.

<sup>18</sup> Tom Bowman, “Pentagon Faces Transformation,” *The Baltimore Sun*, March 13, 2001, 1A.

<sup>19</sup> Rumsfeld often complained about leaks. His exasperation was evident in one interview, where he stated, “My Lord, in this place, all you have to do is think about something and it is leaked.” Duffy. To some extent, this concern over leaks was justified, as discussed in the section on the responses by the military and Congress.

<sup>20</sup> Military interviews A and B. See also Tom Donnelly, “Cheap Hawks: The Bush Administration’s Surprisingly Stingy Defense Spending Request,” *Weekly Standard*, June 11, 2001, 14 (Donnelly) (noting initial review “was supposed to replace” QDR).

<sup>21</sup> See John T. Correll, “In Pursuit of a Strategy,” *Air Force Magazine*, August 2001, p. 7 (Correll) (noting that Marshall’s study was only one of more than a dozen assigned by Rumsfeld, but it took more than three months for the Pentagon to make this clear.). There were many other press errors in reporting caused by rumors arising from the secretiveness of the review.

<sup>22</sup> Military interviews A and B. See also Elaine Grossman, “Rumsfeld Rejects Linchpin Force Structure Findings in Major Review,” *Inside the Pentagon*, July 19, 2001 (Grossman, July 19) (“many groups came to conflicting conclusions”); Donnelly (“no overarching guidance”).

<sup>23</sup> Correll. See also Donnelly (“Rumsfeld now says he will roll his review into the formal” QDR.).

<sup>24</sup> Grossman, July 19 (noting that the QDR study teams “largely have ignored” the findings from the initial review); Military interview B.

<sup>25</sup> The Military Force Structure Act of 1996 provided for the first QDR and the Fiscal 2000 National Defense Authorization Act made the requirement permanent. Jim Garamone, “QDR: Blueprint to Military Transformation,” *American Forces Press Service*, July 11, 2001.

<sup>26</sup> This is based on, among other things, the author’s January 4, 2002, interview with a staff member of Congress who is familiar with the military and the QDR process. (Interview with congressional staff.) See also Ricks February 10 (1997 QDR “produced a document that recommended little change in the status quo.”)

<sup>27</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld, Joint Chiefs Spar Over Roles in Retooling Military,” *Washington Post*, May 25, 2001, A2.

<sup>28</sup> Correll.

<sup>29</sup> Mr. Cambone (later becoming deputy undersecretary of defense for policy) helped lead Rumsfeld’s initial strategic review and prepared the QDR TOR. Mr. Cambone’s approach during the initial review and the QDR irked many members of the military. See e.g., Grossman, July 19 (citing a Pentagon official who stated that Cambone “has precious little respect for the military.”)

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<sup>30</sup> The first draft of the QDR was given to the military on September 14, many of whose comments were incorporated into the final QDR between September 14 and 26. Military interview B.

<sup>31</sup> Reflecting the quantity, if not the quality of the meetings, Rumsfeld apparently kept a list of when he met with the military. During an interview, Rumsfeld noted “in his first seven months in office, he had met … 320 times with military leaders.” He also referred to 93 meetings with the press and 361 meetings with Congress during this same time period. Vernon Loeb and Walter Pincus, “Rumsfeld: New Strategy Near,” *Washington Post*, August 23, 2001, 1.

<sup>32</sup> See Ricks August 7 (by the time of the late May meetings between Rumsfeld and the JCS “the damage had been done, a Pentagon official noted: ‘Once you lose the trust of the military people, it is hard to regain it.’”)

<sup>33</sup> Military interviews A and B. See also David A. Fulghum, “QDR Becomes ‘Pabulum’ As Decisions Slid,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, October 8, 2001, 70 (Fulghum) (“To do the study properly would have taken much more time than was available.”) At the same time, while the September 11 terrorist attacks effectively ended work on the QDR, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz noted in congressional testimony that the QDR was “largely completed” prior to September 11. See Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, “*Prepared Statement by Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz for the 2001 QDR Hearing Before the SASC*,” 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, October 4, 2001, 6, located at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20011004depseddef.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20011004depseddef.html) (Wolfowitz testimony.). See also QDR, p. V.

<sup>34</sup> Particularly during the flurry of meetings between the JCS and Rumsfeld that began in late May, the JCS were hindered by not having their staff experts in attendance to consult at the meetings. Based on the author’s January 4, 2002, interview with a journalist who writes extensively on defense issues. (Media interview.)

<sup>35</sup> See e.g., Fulghum (“The report is pabulum at best.”) A copy of the QDR can be found at [www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> In his opening remarks prior to Wolfowitz’ testimony on the QDR, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) complained that the “QDR seems to me to be full of decisions deferred.” Wolfowitz testimony. The Defense Planning Guidance, issued toward the end of August, goes into other issues not dealt with in the QDR and hands out over 130 tasks for further research by the military. See e.g., Fulghum.

<sup>37</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld on High Wire of Defense Reform,” *Washington Post*, May 20, 2001, A1.

<sup>38</sup> Ricks, August 7.

<sup>39</sup> Ricks, August 7.

<sup>40</sup> This is reflected in news articles at the time, some of which are cited in this paper. The nature and accuracy of the information being reported in the press seemed to confirm that those inside the Pentagon were passing it on. For instance, information on the initial review panels – including membership – was secret and the fact that newspapers were reporting this information confirmed there was an inside source. Military interview B. While it is difficult to state with certainty that members of the military provided specific information, it is a fairly safe assumption that they were a source of at least some of the information, given their level of frustration, concern and alienation. As one journalist noted, while it does not take a sense of alienation for the military to talk to the press, it does prompt more discussion. Media interview.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with congressional staff.

<sup>42</sup> This highlighted the difference in cultures between the Congress and the Rumsfeld’s DoD. See e.g., George C. Wilson, “CEO Rumsfeld and His Pentagon, Inc.,” *National Journal*, March 17, 2001, 812 (Wilson). (noting that Rumsfeld’s staff called those from Capitol Hill “Hillbillies,” and one source stated “this ‘Hillbilly’ [Fowler] was rejected in favor of a corporate type who had met a payroll.”)

<sup>43</sup> Interview with congressional staff. (Noting that while there are now several congressional staff at DoD, felt that there was a general reluctance to draw on congressional staff for DoD positions and speculated that the service secretaries wanted their own – business – people.)

<sup>44</sup> See, e.g., Harmon Ullman, “Up in Arms Over Defence,” *Financial Times* (London), May 24, 2001, 13. (“Many members of Congress … see the secretiveness of the defence review as challenging their authority.”)

<sup>45</sup> Congress eventually agreed with DoD that the Federal Advisory Committee Act did not apply. Interview with congressional.

<sup>46</sup> James Dao, “In Protest, Republican Senators Hold Up Defense Confirmations,” *New York Times*, May 10, 2001, sec. A, p. 30.

<sup>47</sup> Duffy.

<sup>48</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, “82 Lawmakers Sign Letter to Pentagon,” *Washington Post*, August 3, 2001, 8.

<sup>49</sup> Duffy.

<sup>50</sup> See Duffy (Noting that the proposal to close bases reactivated the military/congressional alliance that formed in 1993 to counter President Clinton's proposal to loosen rules on gays in the military and that what was once used to "undermine the last President" is "now being used to undermine Rummy.")

<sup>51</sup> Dettmer.

<sup>52</sup> But cf. "Maneuvers," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 14, 2001 (noting that by August the service secretaries seemed to be on the side of the military and Congress and protecting their turf).

<sup>53</sup> See "White House Taps Tech Industry for Service Chiefs, Department of Defense to Get Business-Style of Management," *Journal of Electronic Defense*, July 1, 2001 (discusses corporate experience of service secretaries).

<sup>54</sup> Stan Crock, "A Hostile Takeover of the Pentagon," *Business Week*, July 2, 2001, 45 (Crock).

<sup>55</sup> Crock.

<sup>56</sup> Crock. It remains to be seen whether White gets dragged into the mess associated with Enron's bankruptcy.

<sup>57</sup> Katherine McIntire Peters, "At Defense Inc., Rules are Changing," *Government Executive Magazine*, September 1, 2001.

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g. Crock (SEC "serves as a personal board of directors").

<sup>59</sup> Jim Garamone, "Council to Implement Business Practices, Transformation," *American Forces Press Service*, June 19, 2001.

<sup>60</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, "Business Initiatives Promote DoD Transformation Goals," *American Forces Press Service*, November 14, 2001.

<sup>61</sup> Amy Svitak, "Pentagon Planning May Shift to Political Appointees," *Defense News*, November 27, 2001, 10. (Svitak)

<sup>62</sup> Svitak

<sup>63</sup> See e.g., Pat Towell, "The Rumsfeld Mandate: Invent the Military's Future," *CQ Weekly*, May 12, 2001, 1054.

<sup>64</sup> See e.g., Wilson ("Rumsfeld is fending off congressional demands that he quickly submit a request for emergency money for the military this fiscal year and that he revamp the Clinton defense budget for fiscal year 2001. He argues that those money requests should await his ongoing strategic review."); Richard J. Newman, "Tough Choices," *U.S. News & World Report*, February 26, 2001, 18 ("Bush has pledged more money for defense, but only after he sees a thorough strategy review.").

<sup>65</sup> Donnelly.

<sup>66</sup> See e.g., Richard Lowry, "Bombing at the Pentagon: Don Rumsfeld's Agony," *National Review*, September 3, 2001 (one expert stated that "Bush will fire [Rumsfeld]" while another predicted "a glorious retirement"); Philip Gold, "Savaging Donald Rumsfeld," *Washington Times*, August 28, 2001, 15 ("rumor has it that there are even Pentagon betting pools on when Rumsfeld will be out.")

<sup>67</sup> "Cebrowski Appointed as Director of Force Transformation," *American Forces Press Service*, November 26, 2001. Before this office was established, the military saw transformation as its domain. Military interview A.

<sup>68</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, "White Announces Realignments to Address Homeland Security," *American Forces Press Service*, October 26, 2001.

<sup>69</sup> "Rumsfeld Seeks to Create Civilian Posts for Intel, Homeland Security," *Inside the Pentagon*, December 6, 2001, 1.

<sup>70</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld's Hands-On War," *Washington Post*, December 9, 2001, A1. Some may find Rumsfeld's hands-on approach discussed in this and other articles contrary to his quote cited at the beginning of this paper that the Secretary of Defense is not a "super general."

<sup>71</sup> Media interview.

<sup>72</sup> Statement made by Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) during December 7, 2001, National War College visit.

<sup>73</sup> This reflects the saying that began circulating after September 11 that Rumsfeld may not be a great Secretary of Defense, but he is a great "Secretary of War."

<sup>74</sup> A retired senior military officer who spoke at the NWC recently, discussed the heightened political astuteness of the military, particularly its senior officers.